L'on montre: 1) que l'affirmation tschirnhausienne selon laquelle l'art de découvrir transforme notre nature en une nature quasi surhumaine qui semble assez participer de celle de Dieu, et en laquelle C. Thomasius avait subodoré un fort relent spinoziste, est explicable, et est effectivement expliquée par Tschirnhaus dans sa Medicina mentis, d'une façon qui ne saurait effaroucher un théologien orthodoxe; 2) que, malgré la modernité de certaines vues de Tschirnhaus relatives au rôle de l'expérience, cet auteur n'a pas perçu la véritable (...) fonction de la „confirmation" expérimentale, contrairement à ce qu'on admet fréquemment de nos jours; 3) pourquoi il convient de penser que c'est dans Spinoza que Tschirnhaus a puisé sa conception des définitions génétiques; 4) que, contrairement à l'opinion courante, ie manuscrit de la Mediana mentis a vraisemblablement été envoyé en Hollande en latin . Suivent des indications bibliographiques et un erratum. (shrink)

The most recent commentator on this line, D. R. Shackleton Bailey, states that ‘spiritus is breath rather than odour’ and he has the support of some commentators, Marcilius, for example, who amends notus to motus, and Hertzberg, who takes it as sweet breath, citing Mart. 3. 65. 1. So also most translators : an exception is D. Paganelli who translates ‘aucun souffle, aucune odeur d'adultère’. However, the parallels cited by Shackleton Bailey are irrelevant to this situation: Afranius 243, Ach. Tat. (...) 2. 37. 9, and Claud. Carm. Min. 29. 33 all refer to the period just before, during, or immediately after the sexual act. It is most unlikely that this is the case in Propertius' poem. Propertius has come to see if Cynthia has spent the night alone; it is not a question of catching her inflagrante delicto, but of finding some rival there or the evidence of his stay not yet removed. Cynthia is indignant at her lover's suspicions and lest he should think that his rival had left earlier, she coarsely specifies the evidence that Propertius might expect to find, including spiritus admisso notus adulterio. (shrink)

Discusssion of passages 243 et. seq. of Wittgenstein's Philosophical lnvestigations tends to concentrate on the argument supporting the thesis that a logically private language is impossible. When the discussion becomes broader, the presumption is generally that this thesis is one premifs of an argument against solipsism. I believe that the passages will support a valid argument that might, at first glance, give comfort to someone in the egocentric predicament, but that this comfort would quickly grow cold on closer examination. I (...) do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein offers no escape from the predicament, only that the escape will not be a consequence of the pluralism necessary to the existence of language, but rather a byproduct of his discussion of the logic of mental discourse. In this paper, I state an alternative to the contra-solipsist reading of the passages, taking Wittgenstein there to be reflecting a three part dispute, the other participants of which are a skeptic and a philosopher I'll call ‘the Realist'. (shrink)

Graham Oppy has launched the most effective criticism to date of an argument for God’s existence from the existence of irreducible mental states or theirregular correlation with physical states (AC). I seek to undercut Oppy’s central defeaters of AC. In particular, I argue, first, that Oppy has not provided successful defeaters against the use of a distinctive form of explanation—personal explanation—employed in premise (3) of AC; second, I expose a confusion on Oppy’s part with respect to AC’s premise (5), and (...) show that this confusion results in a failure to grasp adequately the dialectical force of (5). As a result, Oppy fails to offer adequate rejoinders to (5), or so I shall argue. (shrink)

Foundations of Humanism is a primer on secular humanism written by one of the leading figures in the movement. J.P. van Praag writes that the modern world is shaped by a central paradox: the technology that provides us with unprecedented possibilities at the same time imposes an oppressive organization on society. This organization, with its trappings of overspecialization and overcentralization, promotes feelings of impotence and alienation and a spirit of rebellion, especially in the young. In this book, van Praag examines (...) the ways in which the philosophy of humanism can be applied to this paradox of modern life. Humanism holds that the purpose of life is life itself. Van Praag demonstrates how, through the application of this principle, the paradox can be transcended and how personal fulfillment and social creativity can be achieved. Foundations of Humanism is designed to give the reader a comprehensive view of secular humanism, including its historical roots in classical Greece and the Renaissance, its elaboration as a formal philosophy, and its practical aspects as a social philosophy. Finally, it explores the application of humanist principles in counseling and education. (shrink)

This volume focuses on the modeling of cognition, and brings together contributions from psychologists and researchers in the field of cognitive science.

Hume fully recognised, and partially explained, the role of inductions from single experiments in human knowledge - something his Scottish critics, and some more recent ones, failed to understand. Those inferences, he maintains, depend on the use of a Newtonian rule and the removal of superfluous circumstances. But that rule is not sufficient, and Hume never stated the exact conditions of this removal. We should distinguish between survey and experience in his philosophy, to understand how experience of conjunctions where inductive (...) knowledge has accumulated, in uniform or regular classes or sets of phenomena, may produce cognitive situations when once is enough - without relying on any mysterious innate principles. (shrink)

Hume fully recognised, and partially explained, the role of inductions from single experiments in human knowledge - something his Scottish critics, and some more recent ones, failed to understand. Those inferences, he maintains, depend on the use of a Newtonian rule and the removal of superfluous circumstances. But that rule is not sufficient, and Hume never stated the exact conditions of this removal. We should distinguish between survey and experience in his philosophy, to understand how experience of conjunctions where inductive (...) knowledge has accumulated, in uniform or regular classes or sets of phenomena, may produce cognitive situations when once is enough - without relying on any mysterious innate principles. (shrink)

Steve Cowan had criticized my defense of theistic science on four grounds: (1) my critique of compatibilism attacks a straw man; (2) libertarianism cannot meet some of the conditions for responsible action; (3) attributing libertarian agency to God has the unacceptable implication that God can do evil; and (4) we don’t need libertarianism to provide a model of divine actions sufficient to justify the scientific detectability of miracles. I clarify and respond to these points in the order listed and conclude (...) that Cowan’s critique fails. (shrink)